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wAbstract
Research programs in empirical psychology from the past two
decades have revealed implicit biases. Although implicit processes
are pervasive, unavoidable, and often useful aspects of our cogni-
tions, they may also lead us into error. The most problematic forms
of implicit cognition are those which target social groups, encoding
stereotypes or reflecting prejudicial evaluative hierarchies. Despite
intentions to the contrary, implicit biases can influence our behav-
iours and judgements, contributing to patterns of discriminatory
behaviour. These patterns of discrimination are obviously wrong
and unjust. But in remedying such wrongs, one question to be
addressed concerns responsibility for implicit bias. Unlike some par-
adigmatic forms of wrongdoing, such discrimination is often unin-
tentional, unendorsed, and perpetrated without awareness; and
the harms are particularly damaging because they are cumulative
and collectively perpetrated. So, what are we to make of questions
of responsibility? In this article, we outline some of the main lines of
recent philosophical thought, which address questions of responsi-
bility for implicit bias. We focus on (a) the kind of responsibility at
issue; (b) revisionist versus nonrevisionist conceptions of responsi-
bility as applied to implicit bias; and (c) individual, institutional, and
collective responsibility for implicit bias.1 | INTRODUCTION
Research programs in empirical psychology from the past two decades have revealed that implicit biases are per-
vasive. Implicit biases are typically characterised as automatic associations, of which we may not be aware, that
are difficult to control and may conflict with our professed beliefs and values.1 Although implicit processes are
pervasive, unavoidable, and often useful aspects of our cognitions, they may also lead us into error. The most
problematic forms of implicit cognition are those which target social groups, encoding stereotypes or reflecting
prejudicial evaluative hierarchies. Despite intentions to the contrary, these biases can influence our behaviours
and judgements, contributing to patterns of discriminatory behaviour. Here is a paradigmatic example in which
implicit biases influence behaviour and judgement:Trust Project Grant, on Bias and Blame (RPG‐2013‐326). We are grateful for their
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2 of 13 HOLROYD ET AL.Professor P is engaged in anti‐racist and feminist activities. She explicitly avows egalitarian values and
strives for fair treatment. She believes her students deserve to be treated with equal consideration,
and hasn't reflected much on her behaviour, since it seems to her there is no reason for concern.
Accordingly, she believes that she adheres to her egalitarian goals, which is what she wants and
endorses.
However, Professor P harbours implicit biases of the sort found by empirical psychology: associations
between whites and intellect (Amodio & Devine, 2006), and negative evaluative associations with
black people (Olson & Fazio, 2006). These implicit cognitions influence her behaviour towards her
students – again, in ways we might predict given the findings of empirical psychology: her
evaluations of the equally good work of black students is slightly less glowing than that of white
students (Wood, Hales, Purdon, Sejersen, & Hayllar, 2009); her interactions with black students are
beset by micro‐behaviours that indicate greater tension and discomfort, and as a result she is
marginally less warm and less patient with them than with her white students (Dovidio, Gaertner,
Kawakami, & Hodson, 2002).
Professor P is not unique – but wholly typical; her colleagues show a similar pattern of evaluations
and behavioural interactions, which subtly discriminate against black students. The cumulative
effects of this are manifest: fewer black students occupy the top percentiles of classes in her
department, fewer pursue or are encouraged to pursue further study in her subject, the student
body in her discipline, at the levels at which it is selected for, are disproportionately white.In this scenario, implicit biases are complicit in racially discriminatory behaviour, both in individual interac-
tions, and as part of a pattern of behaviours that contribute, alongside other exclusionary factors to sustaining
the under‐representation of black students in higher education. Note that higher education is not unique; sim-
ilar scenarios may be found in many domains of education and employment. Implicit racial biases have been
found in studies that examine biases in healthcare contexts (Green et al., 2007), housing (Kang, 2014; Turner
& Ross, 2007), the criminal justice system (Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004), financial decisions (Tetlock,
Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000, see Madva, 2016a for instructive discussion), and in everyday interper-
sonal interactions (Dovidio et al., 2002). Moreover, other implicit biases target gender, sexuality, age, or disabil-
ity (Cooley, Payne, Loersch, & Lei, 2014; Levy & Banaji, 2002; Valian, 1999; Wilson & Scior, 2014). It is very
likely that any one individual harbours and is influenced by some sort of implicit bias; the findings mean that
we cannot rule out that, for each of us, we are influenced in our judgements or behaviours in discriminatory
ways.2
Such patterns of discrimination are obviously wrong and unjust. But in remedying such wrongs, one
question to be addressed concerns responsibility for implicit bias. Yet, unlike some paradigmatic forms of
wrongdoing, discriminatory behaviour resulting from implicit bias is often unintentional, unendorsed, and perpe-
trated without awareness; and the harms may be particularly damaging because they are cumulative and collec-
tively perpetrated. Similarly, the cognitions involved in the biases are ones from which agents may be alienated,
because they conflict with endorsed values; the agent may not be aware of their presence in her cognition; nor
aware of their role in behaviour. So, what are we to make of questions of responsibility, for the cognitions
themselves or for actions influenced by them? In this article, we outline some of the main lines of recent phil-
osophical thought which address questions of responsibility for implicit bias. Our main focus, in keeping with
much of the literature, is on responsibility for actions influenced by such biases. These debates have import
both for how we think about and respond to implicit bias and for our understandings of responsibility. We
focus on (a) the kind of responsibility at issue; (b) revisionist versus nonrevisionist conceptions of responsibility
as applied to implicit bias; and (c) individual, institutional, and collective responsibility for implicit bias. We
close with a practical example of institutional responsibility and implicit bias training that animates some of
these issues.
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In remedying wrongs, we might be interested both in causal responsibility and moral responsibility; that is, we
want to know both who or what brought about the wrong and who is to blame for it. Notably, some have
argued that attention to individuals and their implicit biases is inapt in addressing these patterns of discrimina-
tion, because the causal responsibility for such inequalities and discriminatory patterns is fundamentally structural
(Anderson, 2012; Haslanger, 2015). Accordingly, remedies would do better to target these fundamental,
structural causes.
On the other hand, others have maintained that implicit biases, and crucially, actions that manifest them, are
causally responsible for some of these harms and inequalities (Saul, 2013a)—and, attention should be paid to
understanding the role of implicit bias in sustaining these harms and attempting to mitigate their influence.
However, in drawing attention to the role of implicit biases in sustaining harms and exclusion, it has been
contentious whether individuals are always morally responsible for these harms. Saul (2013a) has suggested not,
writing that we shouldabandon the view that all biases against stigmatised groups are blameworthy … [because a] person
should not be blamed for an implicit bias that they are completely unaware of, which results solely
from the fact that they live in a sexist culture. (2013a: 55, emphasis in original)Here, Saul (2013a) focuses on whether individuals are responsible merely for having implicit biases. How-
ever, this question is distinct from the question of whether one is responsible for manifesting implicit bias in
one's actions, and one may be blameworthy for one's actions even if one is not blameworthy for the presence
of the implicit association in one's cognitive make up (Holroyd, 2012). In any case, Saul (2013a) suggests that
once individuals are aware that they have, and may be influenced by, implicit biases, they are responsible for
doing something about it:They may, however, be blamed if they fail to act properly on the knowledge that they are likely
to be biased—e.g., by investigating and implementing remedies to deal with their biases (ibid.)Saul's (2013a) remarks here exemplify both the backward‐looking concern with appraising individuals for
their cognitions and behaviours; and attention to the forward‐looking issues concerned with taking responsibility
for correcting harms and mitigating costs (of course, failure to meet these forward‐looking obligations may
render one blameworthy, in the backward‐looking sense, for that failure). In the wider debate, theorists have
teased apart the forward‐ and backward‐looking concerns into (inter alia) the following different questions, each
of which might legitimately be regarded as concerning a sense in which the agent is responsible:
a. Does the attitude or act reflect badly (or well) on the agent; is there are fault (or indeed credit) that can be attrib-
uted to her?
b. Should the agent be regarded as blameworthy for the fault she has, or has demonstrated in her action; should she
bear some cost or burden (in the form of sanction or blame) for this?
These two questions are backward‐looking and contrast with a third concern, namely,
c. What forward‐looking obligations do individuals have for dealing with the fault, or problematic behaviour?
Those familiar with the responsibility literature will be aware that the two backward‐looking concerns, above,
have sometimes been characterised as questions of attributability (a) and accountability (b) (cf. Smith, 2012; Watson,
1996). However, these two terms have (confusingly) garnered somewhat different usage in the literature on respon-
sibility for implicit bias. Zheng (2016) has labelled the backward‐looking senses (a and b) as together questions of
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distributed (this way of using the two notions, Zheng, 2016 notes, has more in common with the way Scanlon uses
the terms).
All three questions are activated in thinking about responsibility for implicit bias. To avoid terminological
confusion, in the following discussion, we make reference to the particular question at the issue: does it reflect on
the agent; is she blameworthy for it (the backward‐looking questions); do obligations to address bias attach to an
agent (the forward‐looking concerns)?
Zheng (2016) argues that we arrive at different senses of responsibility via different routes. The backward‐
looking questions concern what reflects well or badly on the agent, such that they are subject to “appraisive
responses” such as praise or blame (or perhaps other evaluations of character). Blameworthiness, thus construed, is
a backward‐looking matter. For example, to find Professor P responsible in this sense would be to suppose that her
discriminatory evaluations and behaviours flow from the relevant features of her agency—some metaphysical or
psychological facts—which allow those actions to reflect on her as an agent and enable us to perhaps find her
blameworthy for those harmful acts she perpetrates.
In contrast, the forward‐looking concerns (what Zheng, 2016 calls accountability) track not deep facts about the
agent and what reflects on her, but rather social facts about the distribution of benefits and burdens when something
has gone wrong: who should step in to deal with the costs of wrongdoing, irrespective of whether they were at fault.
We might hold Professor P to be charged with acting to remedy the costs of the harms she is implicated in, irrespec-
tive of whether we think those harms are ones that reflect on her, or for which she is blameworthy.
In some cases of implicit bias, it may be clear that the biases warrant backward‐looking and appraisive responses,
for example, in cases where the agent has cultivated the biases, this would reflect badly on her, and she may be blame-
worthy for her biases. Likewise, in cases in which the agent endorses or would endorse the discriminatory behaviour
(Holroyd, 2016; Zheng, 2016), the behaviour appears to reflect a fault on her part; moreover, judgements of blame
and expressions of blame—may also be engaged.
However, in other cases—which meet the paradigm illustrated by Professor P—things may not be so clear. Various
authors have suggested that there are reasons for which the discriminatory behaviour may not reflect badly on the
agent, and certainly not in a way that warrants blame (see, e.g., Saul, 2013a, quoted above; Levy, 2012, 2014 and
Section 3 below), because the behaviour is not something the agent is aware of, nor under the agent's control. On
the other hand, Brownstein sets out the case for taking actions that express implicit bias to be reflective of who
the agent is, insofar as they reflect the agent's cares (which may not form a coherent set, and hence may conflict with
her other cares). What the agent cares about, Brownstein suggests, is reflected in multitrack patterns of behaviour
that reveal the agent's dispositions (2015: 12). As such actions that express implicit bias can be attributable to the
agent and may ground moral appraisals of her.
In any case, one might hold such agents responsible in the in the sense of having forward‐looking obligations to
deal with the problem, irrespective of whether bias, or actions influenced by it, reflects badly on them or is something
for which they can be blamed (Zheng, 2016). Withholding backward‐looking appraisive judgements and maintaining
that the agent is responsible only in the forward‐looking sense of having remedial obligations may seem appealing
for three reasons. First, one may have doubts about appraising an agent yet insist that it is important that someone
is held responsible nonetheless (though see Holroyd, 2012, Brownstein, 2015, and the discussion in Section 3 below,
for arguments addressing different versions of such doubts). As Zheng (2016: 74) puts it, it is important that we are
held to forward‐looking responsibilities “because it is appropriate for us to clean up after our own actions when a
mess has been made,” even if the mess does not reflect badly on us, or warrant blame. When someone has been
harmed by implicit bias, she is owed “compensation, apology, and redress” irrespective of whether anyone is found
to be at fault or blameworthy (2016: 74). (Note that it remains for proponents of this strategy to delineate senses
of apology and redress that can play this function, whilst being distinct from those appraisive responses characteristic
of backward‐looking responsibility judgements.) Second, it may be difficult to identify, with sufficient certainty to
warrant blame, whether implicit bias has played a role in discriminatory behaviour in any isolated case.
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engagement of the appraisive responses. Saul (2013a) worries that blame might produce backlash or hostility. This
is a common concern: Zheng (2016:80) marshals evidence (Legault, Gutsell, & Inzlicht, 2011), which suggests that high
threat confrontations can produce defensiveness and greater bias (implicit and explicit); Vargas (2017) raises worries
about securing the needed buy‐in for norms against bias, if agents experience backlash in response to blame that is
not accepted or well received.
The appeal of a focus on holding people responsible in the exclusively forward‐looking sense, for actions
influenced by implicit bias, rests on (i) the extent to which we are convinced that agents are not (or cannot be
identified as) responsible in the backward‐looking senses (more on this in Section 3 below); and (ii) the plausibility
of concerns about negative responses to appraisive evaluations such as blame.
On this latter point, it is worth noting that appraisive responses may include a wide range of moral evaluations
that need not be characterised by “high threat” features (such as high emotion, or challenge to the agent's
self‐conception or esteem). For a start, appraisals that focus on whether biases reflect badly on the agent (sense
(a) above) may not involve blame at all. Rather, they might invoke an evaluative judgement about the agent and
her character—she is cruel, or she is racist—without taking a stance on whether this is her fault. This is the sort
of “aretic appraisal” (Watson, 1996) that has been taken to be distinct from judgements of blameworthiness or
expressions of blame. But even blaming responses may not be high threat. Instead, preliminary empirical work by
Malle et al. (2014) suggests that individuals are more likely to see responses as forms of blaming when they are
thoughtful, calm, and delivered without high emotion (in contrast, see the conception of blame outlined and
critiqued by Pickard, 2013, which supposes blame has an emotional “sting”). Finally, some initial work on reac-
tions to blame for implicit racial bias has found that blaming responses did not increase implicit biases and in
fact significantly increased individuals' explicit intentions to take action to address bias. This effect on explicit
intentions was long lasting, persisting in a 6 month retest, in which participants continued to report stronger
motivations to tackle discrimination (see Scaife, Holroyd, Stafford, & Bunge, (ms.)).3 In short, no “backlash effect”
was observed. This result may seem surprising at first. But note that it is less so if worries about blame for
implicit bias rest on a mistaken paradigm of blaming communications: one that supposes that individuals are
being told they are bad and wrong. Instead, blame for implicit bias might be better modelled—at least in some
cases—as a communication in which individuals are alerted to the fact that they have violated a norm that they
already (rightly) endorse (see Scaife et al., ms. for more discussion). We might expect reactions to these different
sorts of communication to elicit rather different responses. It seems that considerable work is still to be done on
understanding how to model different sorts of moral response and on empirically evaluating how they are
received and reacted to.
If responses such as blame are effective in influencing individuals' attitudes towards avoiding implicit bias, then
there may be reason to deploy such responses irrespective of whether individuals in fact deserve such responses.
But absent desert, the justificatory burden for blame is certainly greater. So, much hinges on whether agents are in
fact blameworthy for implicit bias or implicitly biased actions. This depends on how we conceive of the conditions
for this kind of responsibility, to which we now turn.3 | FOLK VERSUS REVISIONIST CONCEPTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY
Many philosophical conceptions of responsibility aim to articulate, perhaps with some refinements, the conditions of
responsibility embedded within and deployed by folk conceptions of responsibility. Whilst there is of course much
long standing philosophical disagreement over how to articulate and unpack this conception, many agree on the
centrality of the following notions in determining moral responsibility, in the sense of blameworthiness, for attitudes
and actions based upon them: awareness or knowledge conditions, and control conditions (which authors have spelled
out in terms of reasons‐responsiveness or evidence‐sensitivity conditions that have featured heavily in the literature
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responsible, the agent's attitudes are under her control in that they are suitably responsive to reasons and to evidence;
she is aware of what she is doing and of the consequences of her actions; and she is able to ensure her actions reflect
her endorsed values.
It is clear enough that the discriminatory actions influenced by implicit bias—such as the evaluations and interac-
tions of Professor P—do not meet this paradigm. Professor P′s implicit biases are not sensitive to her other (eviden-
tially supported) attitudes, beliefs and values, but conflict with them; she is unaware that she discriminates; and she
does so automatically, without the reflective or deliberative control we are sometimes able to exercise. This departure
from the paradigm cases of moral responsibility has lead some authors to claim that individuals are not responsible
for actions influenced by implicit bias: such actions cannot reflect badly on them, nor are they always blameworthy
for them (see Saul, 2013a above).
Levy offers extensive arguments for the claim that individuals such as Professor P are not blameworthy for
implicitly biased actions, because her actions are not actions of which she is appropriately consciously aware;4 nor
is she able to exercise reflective control over them; nor are the attitudes integrated with (or responsive to) her
endorsed evaluative attitudes (Levy, 2012, Levy, 2014, forthcoming). Accordingly, Levy claims, they cannot be
reflective of who the agent is, and so it cannot be appropriate to respond with certain burdens (sanction, blame,
and punishment; forthcoming: 4).
But of course, it is debatable whether the notions of awareness, or control, deployed in such arguments
are the relevant ones for blameworthiness (see Holroyd, 2012), and some lines of debate have engaged
these issues.Awareness
Consider first the awareness requirement. The idea that we are responsible (in the sense of blameworthy for) only for
those attitudes or actions that fall within, or are guided by, conscious awareness faces sustained critical challenge
from Sher (2009). Such a condition would implausibly render us exculpated from (inter alia) any instance of absent-
mindedness, inattention, or forgetting (cf. Smith, 2005). We should instead, Sher suggests, start from the thought, that
“when someone acts wrongly or foolishly, the question on which his responsibility depends is not whether he is aware
that his act is wrong or foolish, but rather whether he should be” (Sher, 2009:20).
In the context of implicit bias, various senses of awareness are in circulation (taxonomised Holroyd, 2014): agents
may have (or lack) introspective awareness of their implicit biases; individuals may have (or lack) inferential awareness
of their proneness to implicit biases, that is, an awareness based on inferences drawn from empirical studies to our
own propensities. Third, individuals may have (or lack) observational awareness, that is, awareness based on the
observation of their own behaviours, in one‐off cases or in patterns of action.5 Relatedly, individuals may be aware
(or not) of the moral significance of their action (Levy, 2014). Combined with Sher's insight, Holroyd argues that
responsibility will depend not on whether individuals in fact have or lack any such sense of awareness, but rather
on whether we should have any of these kinds of awareness; and in the instance in which we do not, whether any
such failure is culpable.
For instance, such a strategy is deployed by Washington and Kelly (2016), who argue that agents in certain posi-
tions of power or authority—those on hiring panels, say—should have awareness of their own likely implicit biases.
That is, given their role responsibilities and the impact of their decisions, they should be aware of the relevant
research on implicit bias, and be able to make inferences about the ways in which their own judgements may be
biased—and, crucially, the steps they may take to mitigate this. The issue is then whether such individuals are culpable
when they lack such awareness.
Washington and Kelly (2016) take this to support “externalist” conditions on responsibility, such that an
individual's failing to be aware of what she should be may or may not be culpable, contingent upon her epistemic
environment. In a context, in which information—from which inferences can be drawn—is not readily available, the
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information is—increasingly—more readily available, we are culpable for lacking awareness of the information of which
we should, and can reasonably be expected to be, aware.
Holroyd (2014) argues that in fact, we need not demand even this inferential awareness; agents may have
observational awareness even in epistemic environments in which research on implicit bias is not “common
knowledge.” This can be gained by careful reflection on one's own behaviour and its role in sustaining patterns
of systemic injustice. Although the relevant observations may be more easily made when information about
implicit bias is prevalent, such information is not necessary. Indeed, prior to the advent of research on implicit
bias, plenty of testimonial evidence from individuals targeted by implicit racial biases could have prompted such
reflections and observations (see Holroyd & Puddifoot, forthcoming). And, insofar as these observations are
blocked by motivated ignorance—avoidance or ignoring (perhaps subconsciously) of evidence that serves one's
goals—or self‐deception, or excessive weight given to misleading introspective evidence, a failure to have this
sort of awareness is culpable to some degree.
In sum, on the folk conception of responsibility, some awareness conditions may be required for individuals to be
blameworthy for their wrongful actions. But it is far from clear that simply lacking conscious awareness of facts about
implicit bias, or the fact that one is discriminating, is exculpatory. Rather, we might expect that individuals—at least in
some epistemic contexts—have, and should have, certain kinds of awareness about their propensity to harbour and
manifest implicit bias.Control
Contention has also arisen over the kind of control necessary to ground blameworthiness for actions influenced by
implicit biases. As Saul (2013a, 2013b) has argued, individuals lack direct control over the activation and influence
of implicit bias. We cannot simply will that biases do not affect us, and make it so. Indeed, studies have indicated that
trying to suppress implicit bias has a rebound effect (Follenfant & Ric, 2010).
However, many aspects of our cognition and action for which we are held responsible are not under our direct
control. This suggests that other forms of control are relevant to moral responsibility. Two questions then arise: what
forms of control are necessary for moral responsibility? And do we have these forms of control with respect to
implicitly biased actions?
Levy (2014, forthcoming) has argued that agent's attitudes must be under a certain kind of rational control—they
must be inferentially sensitive to, and integrate with, the other evidence‐sensitive attitudes of the agent. Drawing on
evidence that implicit attitudes are not inferentially sensitive in the appropriate way, he argues that actions influenced
by implicit biases cannot be reflective of the agent in a way that renders her liable to blame (Levy, 2014 pp.812–816).
Such implicit attitudes cannot, Levy (2014, forthcoming) argues, be properly integrated into the agent.
It is worth noting, however, that any such lack of inferential sensitivity does not necessitate a lack of integration.
Implicit biases may accord with and thereby reflect the agent's values, even if not under rational control (Holroyd,
2016). The paradigm case of this would be an explicit racist who nonetheless has implicit cognitions and automatic
responses, which contribute to (and function in the service of) his morally repugnant goals.
In any case, rational control may not be necessary for moral responsibility: other sorts of control may suffice in
order for agents to meet any control conditions for moral evaluation. For example, Snow (2005) identifies a sort of
‘intervention control’ that agents may exercise over automatic processes (in the context of discussing automaticity,
rather than implicit biases per se—see Holroyd and Kelly, 2016 for discussion of intervention control in the context
of implicit biases). Although the processes themselves are not rationally guided but are automatized and habituated,
agents may intervene to halt or redirect these processes. Such control may be possible in the case of implicit biases.
For example when on a hiring panel, Professor P may intervene to halt the automatic influence of implicit biases, by,
say, referring to a checklist of previously agreed upon criteria, as a strategy to try to overcome any tendency to bias
(cf. WISELI, 2012, p.6).
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techniques such as “implementation intentions.” This technique involves conditioning certain counter‐stereotypical
automatic thoughts in response to environmental cues, for example, automatizing the thought “safe,” as prompted
by any black person, in order to try to overcome associations between blackness and danger or hostility (Stewart
and Payne, 2008). Agents may add to these cognitive props environmental props also—reshaping their social environ-
ment in a way that impacts on their cognitions in desirable ways. For example, some studies have suggested that the
presence of pictures depicting counter‐stereotypical exemplars reduces negative biases (Blair, 2002).
These modes of indirect control—manipulating one's environment or one's cognitions in order to secure desirable
patterns of thought and behaviour—have been identified by Holroyd and Kelly (2016) as forms of “ecological control.”
They argue that this kind of control is in fact mundane, oft‐deployed (e.g., consider organising one's office to ward off
procrastinatory tendencies), and sufficient for meeting control conditions for moral responsibility.
Although the kinds of ecological control so far outlined involve intentionally deploying strategies to exert
control, Holroyd and Kelly (2016) argue that this is not necessary. One form of ecological control outlined is
that of unintentional indirect control: an example of this is the sort of control demonstrated by participants
in Moskowitz and Li's (2011) studies, whereby agents with strong egalitarian commitments appeared to be bet-
ter able to block the activation of implicit biases. This was not explicitly intended by those agents, but seemed
to be an automatic function of their strongly held egalitarian commitments. Because agents who lacked such
commitments were less effective at blocking the activation of implicit stereotypes, Holroyd and Kelly (2016)
argue, it is to the agent's credit and attributable to her, when her values better enable the pursuit of her goals.
Whether agents who are influenced by implicit biases meet control conditions for moral responsibility, then, will
depend on what notion of control one teases out of the folk conception, how defensible this notion of control is, and
the extent to which it is exercised with respect to implicit biases. Note that in teasing out these notions, there is some
refinement of the ideas found in the folk conception: in the articulation of the idea of “ecological control,” for example.
But authors proposing these notions take such ideas to be latent in, or extensions of, the folk concept of moral
responsibility. This contrasts with the strategies deployed by theorists who are explicitly revisionist about moral
responsibility.Revisionism
Some authors have suggested that thinking about blameworthiness for implicit biases should motivate revisions to
this understanding of the concept of moral responsibility, whereby it is acknowledged explicitly that such revisions
involve a departure from seemingly intuitive thought about what it is for attitudes and actions to reflect on us, and
render us liable to blame.
Two authors who propose such revisions are Glasgow (2016) and Faucher (2016). Each is motivated by the idea
that we are morally responsible for actions influenced by implicit biases—but that this can only be adequately captured
by revising our analyses of moral responsibility. For example, Glasgow suggests that whilst common sense suggests
that the conditions for moral responsibility are invariant—they remain constant across agents and contexts—his
reflections on implicit bias lead to the revisionary conclusion that they are variant. In particular, the conditions vary
depending on the content of the attitude held and the action performed on the basis of it (2016: 48; later, Glasgow
suggests that the content is a proxy for the kind or degree of harm caused [2016: 56]). On this view, the content
of the attitude determines whether an agent's alienation from her attitude (or action performed on that basis) suffices
to exculpate. In the case of Frankfurt's alienated drug user, alienation seems to suffice. But in cases where the attitude
involves a relational harm—the attitudes that drive infidelity or prejudicial attitudes involved in implicit biases—the
fact that the agent is alienated from her attitude does not serve to exculpate.
Faucher (2016) also argues for a revisionary form of variantism about moral responsibility. On his view, the
dimension of variation concerns the conditions that are applied depending on one's position in relation to the harm.
If one is—or has been—a victim of discrimination, the conditions one deploys in evaluating moral responsibility will
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this point of view, whether it was consciously intended. However, from the point of view of perpetrators, conscious
intention does matter.
One might think that this difference rests on mistake or disingenuousness on the part of the perpetrators. But if it
is genuine and withstands reflective scrutiny, then our conditions for moral responsibility may turn out to be variant—
and an invariantist articulation of the concept of moral responsibility should be revised accordingly.
Faucher (2016) also suggests that other revisions; first, to the notion of control necessary for responsibility. As
discussed above, forms of indirect control (Faucher, 2016 calls those which involve retraining of one's cognitions a
kind of “bottom‐up” control) may be sufficient for moral responsibility. And notions of responsibility that make
reference to the “real self”—the part of the self that reveals where the agent stands—may have to account for the
agent's real self as including some unendorsed implicit attitudes, as well as her endorsed explicit attitudes.
An explicitly revisionist model of responsibility has been developed and defended by Manuel Vargas in recent
years (2005, 2009, and 2013). His recent work has applied this model to implicit biases. Vargas (2017) sees responsi-
bility judgments as part of a practice that can be justified if it serves certain forward‐looking goals of cultivating moral
agency. On this view, to be a responsible agent is to stand in certain social relations (rather than to meet certain meta-
physical conditions). Thus construed, it is crucial that the agent's context supports moral agency in relation to a certain
set of considerations. Vargas worries that our current environment (the “moral ecology”) does not yet provide the right
sort of support. We are perhaps not yet suitably cognizant of, or sensitive to considerations of implicit bias, to make it
appropriate—or fruitful—to hold each other responsible or liable to blame, on his view. But, as our moral ecology
evolves, it may be appropriate to do so. This line of argument has resonance with Washington & Kelly's (2016)
externalist conditions for moral responsibility, whereby what can reasonably be expected of agents may shift as epi-
stemic environments change. Note also that this view about the current impropriety of blame shares much with the
concerns about the defensiveness and hostility that such appraisive responses may invoke. Yet, as we have seen, it
is not at all clear that we do find these responses—it may instead be that these interpersonal interactions of blame
are part of the tools that shape the moral ecology and increase sensitivity to, and motivation to combat, implicit biases
(Holroyd 2012; Scaife et al., ms.).
These moral responses are premised chiefly on the idea that individualsmay be held responsible for implicit biases.
But this is not the only option.4 | INDIVIDUAL, INSTITUTIONAL, AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY
So far, the focus has been on holding individuals morally responsible for particular discriminatory actions or judge-
ments made under the influence of implicit bias. But as noted at the outset, the problem is not simply one of particular
discriminatory behaviours but also of their role in sustaining patterns of marginalisation, exclusion, and hierarchy.
Insofar as these social structures are collectively caused, sustained, and stand in need of collective remedy, it appears
that an approach that requires collective responsibility is also needed.
Of course, questions remain about who is collectively responsible for what, in both the backward‐ (evaluation of
character or identification of who is to blame) and forward‐looking (who bears remedial costs) senses. One might
maintain that all of us are to blame for, or have a role in remedying, the harms that result from implicit biases. Indeed,
as Jacobsen has noted (2016, 174), agents need not have done anything particularly wrong in order to have been
complicit in sustaining patterns of exclusion. This complicity may justify being held accountable for remedying the
harms. Or one might maintain that responsibility and blameworthiness falls collectively, but proportionally, on those
groups who have greater role in perpetrating harm (cf. Washington and Kelly's (2016) remarks about people in
“gatekeeper” positions having greater responsibilities). Likewise, in terms of forward‐looking responsibility, Sie and
Van Voorst Vader‐Bours suggest that “it seems reasonable to expect those in positions of power to take more
responsibility for change” (2016: 107). Moreover, if it is right that remedying implicit biases is most effectively done
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collective action will be needed to enact this. But as Madva (2016b) has persuasively argued, attention to individual or
collective endeavours should not be seen as competing; rather, the complex interplay between individual and more
collective or structural interventions needs to be recognised. For example, institutional change requires individual
buy‐in and motivation to instigate change. We close with an example of how both institutional and individual
responsibility needs to have a role in practical efforts to remedy implicit bias.
Many institutions now offer “implicit bias training,” seminars that aim to make individuals within an institution
aware of the possibility of implicit biases influencing their behaviour, and of remedies that could be undertaken to
combat this. One model for thinking about these training sessions is in terms of individual responsibility: individuals
are made aware of certain problematic facts (their propensity for bias) and are given certain tools that they can apply
to their cognitions or to their workplace procedures, in order to try to prevent their biases from having a role. This
training devolves (forward‐looking) responsibility to individuals for remedying bias.
However, this model may be flawed, both in terms of efficacy and theoretical warrant. First, if the emphasis is on
individual de‐biasing, this requires that individuals accept and acknowledge that they themselves have implicit bias.
Because cognitive biases include objectivity bias (the propensity to believe that one is more objective than one's
counterparts [Pronin, Gillovich, & Ross, 2004; Rachlinski, Johnson, Wistrich, & Guthrie, 2009]), there are significant
obstacles to securing this acceptance. Moreover, we need not (and often cannot) pinpoint exactly whom is biased
and on what occasions; it suffices to motivate institutional change to know that many individuals will, on many occa-
sions, display certain kinds of biases. Instead, the emphasis should be on the fact that bias is pervasive and as individ-
uals within institutions we should seek procedures that make those institutions robust against the influence of implicit
bias. Second, this model may seem to imply that the primary focus of addressing implicit biases is to de‐bias individ-
uals. If this is the aim, then devolving responsibility to individuals is a flawed strategy: because there exist few studies
that show the long‐term efficacy of changes to implicit biases (Lai et al., 2014, though cf. Madva, ms.). The point is not
that individuals should not try to de‐bias (see Madva, ms. for the claim that such efforts, are, in the grand scheme of
things, rather small), nor that individual attitude change is not relevant at all; but that such efforts should not be inde-
pendent of institutional change, which itself requires that individuals are motivated to institute and sustain those
changes. Moreover, and fundamentally, this model risks obscuring the fact that individual de‐biasing is only part of,
and perhaps instrumental to, the central goal, which is to address patterns of discriminatory outcome. This may be
secured by means other than individual de‐biasing.
The overall point, then, is that in recognising the role that individuals and institutions must play, we see that
institutional responsibility must reach further than simply providing implicit bias training, on the assumption that this
devolves responsibility to individuals for dealing with discrimination. Rather, the responsibility is with (individuals
within) institutions to take sustained measures to address whatever mechanisms are producing discriminatory out-
comes. Implicit bias training may be a part of those measures, but institutional change must extend well beyond this.
ENDNOTES
1 Not all parties to the debate accept this characterisation. See, for example, Mandlebaum, 2015 and Levy, 2014 for the
claim that implicit biases likely have propositional structure.
2 For debate over how likely this is, see Jost et al., 2009; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banagi, 2009; and Oswald,
Mitchel, Blanton, Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013.
3 Note that these findings address one objection to communicating blame but the issue of blameworthiness and whether one
should communicate blame may be thought to come apart (though for some consequentialists, to be blameworthy just is
for there to be sufficient reason to blame). There might be reasons (backlash) to withhold blame even if the agent is blame-
worthy; we can imagine scenarios in which one should blame (if the gains are great) even if the agent is not blameworthy.
4 See Cameron, Payne, & Knobe, 2010 for studies that suggest that Levy's claims have support in the folk conception of
moral responsibility. Terminologically, it is important to note that Levy is concerned with blameworthiness, even though
he frames his question as concerning whether biases are “attributable” to the agent (forthcoming p.4).
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